

Thatcher and François Mitterand were ambivalent, if not hostile, toward changing the status quo, and how George H. W. Bush was undecided until the famous dinner at Laeken, Belgium, on December 3, 1989. Sarotte, firmly keeping her English-speaking audience in mind, continually juxtaposes historical and political background information in order to explain the events leading up to 1989. An American audience, for example, might not be aware that what irked many Germans was the fact that West Germany “contained the largest concentration of nuclear weapons per square mile of any territory in the world, and all of them were controlled by foreigners” (26). A merit of the book is its attempt at an even-handed account of 1989 that does not privilege one perspective over the other. As such, it is highly recommendable for those wanting to get a sense of the various positions (and their ramifications) taken by its actors. It reads well, is well-informed and gripping, as it brings across the “horse trade” drama that led to the current international order.

Sarotte’s book would be an excellent basic text for an undergraduate course on German reunification and its political aftermath. However, if we were to evaluate this book in terms of its stated goals, namely, to be a comparative historical analysis (where one tries to set up “structured and focused comparisons between suitable events,” xiv), it is less successful. For one, it is still highly debatable which of the 1989 events, seen in their national and historical settings, could be considered “suitable” for historical analysis. As a consequence, it is questionable in what way they could be comparably “structured and focused.” Despite the many detailed accounts now available, we do not know why the Leipzig demonstrations did not turn out to be a European Tiananmen. While she well describes the rapid and seemingly uncontrollable elements of the events leading to 1989, Sarotte herself shows that the so-called actors of 1989 were in fact “re-actors” to a historical drama whose origin remains unknown.

In the end, even Mikhail Gorbachev’s leading role is questioned as one comes to see it in the context of various political misinterpretations that have recently been documented. As countless pages of relevant files are being made available, as more documents showing the ineptitude of East-German officials come to light, it becomes clear that the role of “the

media” as a new political force needs to be included in any comparative historical analysis. When we learn that *Wer zu spät kommt, den bestraft das Leben!* [Those who come late, will be punished by life], the phrase that encapsulated the reason for German reunification, was never uttered by Gorbachev—on 5 October 1989, at Schönefeld airport, he is reported to have said: *Ich glaube, Gefahren warten nur auf jene, die nicht auf das Leben reagieren* [I think that danger only awaits those who don’t react to reality] (cf. *Die Zeit* 34.12, August 2004)—we might be inclined to see 1989 less as high drama than as a comedy of errors.

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Treason in the Northern Quarter: War, Terror, and the Rule of Law in the Dutch Revolt. By Henk van Nierop. Translated by J. C. Grayson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), x + 297 pp. \$39.95/£27.95 cloth.

The Dutch Revolt has often been considered as a heroic fight for national liberation against the cruel and tyrannical Spanish King Philip II, necessary to pave the way for the free, liberal and tolerant Dutch Republic and its Golden Age in the seventeenth century. Even outside the Netherlands, particularly within the Anglo-Saxon world, the Dutch Revolt has been identified as an antecedent to the American Revolution and one of the main events leading to a modern world of tolerance and capitalism. Nonetheless, since its first publication in Dutch in 1999, this book has helped to rethink the Dutch Revolt as a civil war, because that was what it was. By pointing out the similarities to the contemporary French Civil Wars, the author integrates the Dutch Revolt in the broader European history of sixteenth-century civil and religious strife, rather than once more turning the conflict into a precursor of modern times.

Moreover, he argues that this “ordinary dirty war” (2) also took place in Holland, the core region of the uprising and subsequent stronghold of the Republic. Its Northern Quarter—the waterlogged peninsula stretching

from Amsterdam to the North Sea—ended up divided on the question of continuing its support of Prince William of Orange and the Beggars. Tensions became especially fierce after the 1575 failure of a Spanish Habsburg general to invade the region and the ensuing repressive campaign of the rebel commanders to find the “traitors.” The extraordinary court (rapidly nicknamed Blood Council) and the arrest and torture of vagrants, peasants and even respectable town burghers made clear that not only the infamous Duke of Alba took refuge in terror. Hence, the conflict during the Dutch Revolt was for most people a question of surviving the lesser of two evils.

Even as this book recalls war and terror during the Dutch Revolt, it also clarifies the pursuit of law during civil unrest, through the life of the Catholic lawyer Jan Jeroenszoon. Arrested for treason and surviving repeated torture, he started a wearisome but successful campaign for re-establishing the rule of law at a time of war and civil strife. Given the possibility of amnesty accorded by the famous 1576 Pacification of Ghent, Jeroenszoon refused to leave prison and was eventually vindicated through a regular procedure before the (rebel) Court of Holland. This book not only offers the first account of the Dutch Revolt from the viewpoint of its victims but also sheds surprising light on the role of law during civil war. For historians of the Dutch Revolt, it thus offers further impetus to study the pacification, reconciliation and peace negotiations during the conflict, for the civil strife not only stemmed from the (here unveiled) doubts on rebelling against the King but equally from the qualms on being reconciled with him.

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Liberalism in Crisis: European Economic Governance in the Age of Turbulence. Edited by Carlo Secchi and Antonio Villafranca (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), xxvii + 214 pp. \$59.95 cloth.

The current economic crisis has raised important questions regarding the financial impact of the race towards continuous growth and the

success and validity of the liberal economic model. In their *Liberalism in Crisis*, Carlo Secchi and Antonio Villafranca, of the Istituto per gli Studi di Political Internazionale, investigate the effects on the European Union (EU) of the current economic crisis and propose several ways for managing this unexpected crisis.

In Chapter 1, Jacques Mistral argues that the crisis jeopardizes globalization and rejects the claim that the current economic turbulence is just a cyclical adjustment of a greater magnitude than those experienced during the last decades. To redefine the governance of the world economy, Mistral argues for a “global grand bargain” and the creation of a new United Nations Economic Security Council. Franco Bruni evaluates explanations of the crisis as a by-product of “excessive liberalization,” qualitatively inadequate and quantitatively scarce regulations, excessive reliance on opaque transactions, or inadequate supervision. In Chapter 3, Karel Lannoo advances policy recommendations for creating an integrated financial supervisory body. After examining the impact of the crisis on the European financial banking and insurance systems, Lannoo discusses European regulatory and supervisory reform, highlighting the shortcomings of the proposals advanced to date.

Daniela Schwarzer analyzes the evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union in the first decade of the euro, the changes in Union governance following the current economic crisis, and the external dimension of the euro. Her tone is cautiously optimistic, given the need for a re-evaluation of the role of discretionary fiscal policy in the Union and for a vision that transcends divisions among EU member states. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the impact of the crisis beyond the financial markets by examining its effects on EU fiscal policy and the compatibility of the fiscal stimulus with the Lisbon agenda, detailing its long-term implications, and calling for a more prudent post-crisis policy of public finance. Building on a comparison between U.S. and EU positions, Chapter 6 makes policy recommendations for the EU. Chapter 7, by Antonio Villafranca, discusses the search for revised multilevel governance in fighting climate change. While the editors caution that it is still impossible to predict the end of what they call the “age of turbulence” they hope that the